Philosophy of education is sometimes assumed to be a rather abstract discipline that is somehow removed from the ‘real’ practice of education – but this has not been my experience. Obviously to base this philosophical conclusion on the approach of evaluating these historical changes the continuity and relativity of these changes have to establish: and it may be best presented as a change of socio-economic philosophy and psychology from pro physical pro manual one reflecting at the time manual labor economic approach as dominating to a pro intellectual one apprehended by the developing high technologies and economic globalization one when intellectual economic approach is dominating.
On the other hand, a fruitful topic for reflection is whether a more self-critical approach to philosophy of education, even if at times it seems to be pulling up its own roots for examination, might prove more productive for thinking about education, because this very tendency toward self-criticism keeps fundamental questions alive and open to reexamination.
Naturally, any philosophical approach aspires to consistency of some sort; but to the extent that critically oriented philosophers are concerned with challenging power structures, hegemonic belief systems, and universalisms that obscure, not to say squelch, the particular beliefs, values, and experiences of those whom they seem to empower, such philosophers must also endeavor to avoid these potentially oppressive tendencies in their own writing and teaching.
In this enlarged sense, the analytical impulse can be seen not only in analytical philosophy per se but also in studies that focus on the logical and epistemological criteria of critical thinking; in the diagnosis of informal fallacies in reasoning; in certain kinds of liberal theory that spell out broad principles of rights and justice but that remain silent on the specific ends that education ought to serve; and even in some versions of German philosopher Jürgen Habermas’s theory, which proposes a structure of communicative deliberation in which conversations must satisfy what he calls a set of general “validity” claims, but which does not specify or constrain in advance what that process of deliberation might yield.
Regarding the teacher says that p” as itself a good reason to believe it appears moreover to contravene the widely shared conviction that an important educational aim is helping students to become able to evaluate candidate beliefs for themselves and believe accordingly.